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"Secrecy is the first essential in the affairs of the state"'
I. INTRODUCTION
As the world becomes more financially interconnected, large governments
seek to impose stringent disclosure requirements upon both domestic and foreign
financial institutions.2 Motivated by a desire to recover lost tax revenue and
curtail money laundering, the United States and the international community
have embarked on a mission to eliminate offshore banking secrecy.' As a result,
many Caribbean States with strict confidentiality practices find themselves in a
precarious position.4 Maintaining strict financial confidentiality is a sure trigger
for attacks by many of the world's financial giants, most notably the United
States On the other hand, raising the veil of confidentiality and allowing access
to sensitive information endangers the viability of offshore financial centers that
are critical to the economies of many Caribbean countries.6 As the United States
and the international community apply pressure upon offshore financial centers
to disclose confidential financial information, the once ironclad banking secrecy
1. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, CONFIDENTIALITY IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW, Oxford University
Press (2002) (citing Cardinal Richelieu in the introduction).
2. See Frank C. Razzano, So You Want to be an International Financial Center ... Are You Prepared to
Spit in the Giant's Eye? 28 SEC. REG. L. J. 326, 327 (2000); ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.03; see generally
Vaughn E. James, Twenty First Century Pirates of the Caribbean: How the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen CARICOM Countries of Their Tax and Economic Policy
Sovereignty, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (noting that regulations of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") that "blacklisted" Caribbean nations with preferential tax
treatment were stripping sovereign nations of the ability to structure their own economic and tax policies).
3. Razzano, supra note 2, at 334-36; ANTOINE, supra note 1, U 1.07, 11.01; S. REP. No. 99-130, at 1
(1985).
4. See Keri Geiger, The Very Long Arm of US Law, LATIN FINANCE, June 1, 2002, at 34, available at
2002 WL 15266623 (discussing the potential collapse of Caribbean financial industries as a result of the U.S.
government's use of the USA PATRIOT Act to deal with both money laundering and tax evasion); Aline
Sullivan, World Watchdogs Make Life Unpleasant Offshore Tax Havens/Going, Going, Gone?, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Mar. 15, 2003 at 13, available at 2003 WL 4535722 (stating that intense pressure from the United States
and international organizations could be the end of offshore banking as we know it, as new regulations erode
bank secrecy).
5. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, W 1.03, 2.39 (describing the clash between offshore jurisdictions that
view confidentiality as an essential ingredient in their financial industry and onshore jurisdictions that are
hostile to confidentiality and have taken drastic measures to prevent it). Additionally, mentioning that the
primary attack upon confidentiality has been by the United States and the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development. Id.; Razzano, supra note 2, at 362; see also Jason Ennis, Cleaning Up the
Beaches: The Caribbean Response to the FATF's Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories,
8 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 637, 638 (2002) (discussing the international response, through the Financial Action
Task force ("FATF"), to what it perceived as inadequate banking regulations in five Caribbean nations). The
FATF then recommended that banks in its member nations pay "special attention" to transactions coming from
those Caribbean countries. Id.
6. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, IT 2.36 (noting that many Caribbean offshore financial centers, are
dependent upon their financial industries because of their location and narrow export economies); see also
James, supra note 2, at 9-10 (discussing how many Caribbean countries turned from agricultural production to
financial services, demonstrating the importance of the financial sector to their economies).
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of the Caribbean financial industry whittles away to nothing.7 This serves as a
disincentive to both individuals and international companies for doing business
with offshore financial centers' and will likely result in the demise of once
thriving offshore financial centers.9 Contrary to popular belief, elimination of
offshore banking secrecy in itself will not solve the global problem of money
laundering or help governments recover lost tax revenues.10
This Comment explores the future of confidentiality in Caribbean offshore
banking by focusing on the USA PATRIOT Act" and international actions.
Part II of this Comment outlines the differences between jurisdictions concerning
the protection of financial information. Specifically, this section compares and
contrasts different jurisdictions' approaches to financial confidentiality. First, this
section examines common law confidentiality protections. Second, it focuses on the
United States, which has limited its financial confidentiality protections.' 2 Finally,
this section discusses two types of confidentiality in offshore jurisdictions," the
7. See Barbara T. Kaplan & Patrick T. O'Brien, Secrecy Associated with Offshore Banking is
Evaporating, 119 BANKING L.J. 736, 736-37 (2002) (concluding that pressure from the FATF and the OECD,
combined with tax disclosure agreements with the United States, have made offshore banking in the Caribbean
dangerous); ANTOINE, supra note 1, 4.09 (stating that offshore centers are aware that an attack upon
confidentiality could cause financial ruin); see also Sullivan, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that pressure from
global and regional organizations, individual countries, and the United States may result in the demise of tax
havens).
8. See infra note 19 and accompanying text (defining the term "offshore financial center").
9. See Razzano, supra note 2, at 327 (observing that over the last thirty years the United States has
attacked offshore secrecy and has won); ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1 11.36 (noting that if current trends continue,
offshore centers will have little choice but to increase disclosure); Akiko Hishikawa, The Death of Tax Havens,
25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 417 (2002) (concluding that even though not entirely successful, OECD
and international pressure have made the "death of tax havens inevitable"); see also Kaplan, supra note 7, at
736-37 (stating that recent events, including tax and anti-money laundering regulations have made it dangerous
to rely on bank secrecy regulations to protect financial privacy when dealing with Caribbean offshore financial
institutions); Susan Bibler Coutin, Bill Maurer & Barbara Yngvesson, In the Mirror: The Legitimization Work
of Globalization, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 832 (2002) (stating that when Caribbean nations ceased to be
colonies, agriculture and tourism declined, leaving them no choice but to enter the financial sector).
10. Jack A. Blum et al., Financial Havens, Bank Secrecy and Money Laundering, 5 CRIME PREVENTION &
CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEWSLETTER (United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention) (New York,
N.Y., 1998), available at http://www.imolin.org/finhaeng.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (last
visited Feb. 12, 2004); see also ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.53 (commenting on the misperceptions surrounding
offshore confidentiality).
11. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT") Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Specifically this
comment will focus on Title III of the Act which amends 31 U.S.C.A § 5318A (West 2003).
12. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.39 (stating that the United States has aggressively attacked
confidentiality practices of offshore finance); see also Berta Esperanza Hernandez, RIP to IRP Money
Laundering and Drug Trafficking Controls Score a Knockout Victory Over Bank Secrecy, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 235, 258 (1993) (concluding that even after modem legislation the U.S. position with regard to bank
secrecy calls for limited confidentiality of financial information).
13. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.01 (defining the different methods that offshore jurisdictions use to
maintain strict financial confidentiality).
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statutory hybrid model created by Switzerland, and a public policy approach
followed by many Caribbean jurisdictions. '4
Part III discusses the current U.S. and international attempts to undermine
banking confidentiality in Caribbean offshore financial centers, and proposes that
this is an effort to recover lost tax revenue and curtail money laundering. The
section begins by exploring current domestic and international tax regulations
used as tools to discourage use of offshore banks and to gain access to financial
documents maintained by those offshore banks.'5 Next, it addresses the domestic
and international response to money laundering prior to the USA PATRIOT Act.
Finally, these sections examine how Caribbean governments have reacted to
efforts to undermine confidentiality.'6
Part IV explores the impact of recent U.S. legislation and international actions
affecting banking confidentiality in the Caribbean, such as the USA PATRIOT Act.
This comment concludes that faced with the devastating consequences of non-
compliance with global pressure, offshore banking confidentiality is threatened with
extinction."
II. CONCEPTS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Prior to any discussion regarding the confidentiality of financial information,
the difference between onshore and offshore banking must be explained. 8 In
addition, it is necessary to define the term "offshore financial center" to
understand the distinct legal and policy considerations present in many Caribbean
jurisdictions. Furthermore, to understand jurisdictional differences regarding
financial confidentiality, it is helpful to explain core terms. 20 The term "onshore"
is used to describe those nations that do not engage in offshore activity. 2' The
14. See id. W 2.02-.07 (analyzing two models of offshore financial confidentiality by tracing the
background of bank confidentiality from Switzerland to Caribbean offshore jurisdictions).
15. See Benjamin R Hartman, Coercing Cooperation From Offshore Financial Centers: Identity and
Coincidence of International Obligations Against Money Laundering and Harmful Tax Competition, 24 B.C.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 253, 254 (2001) (discussing strategies the international community has used to label
many offshore financial centers as "non-cooperative" and as a threat from a tax competition standpoint as well
as from a money laundering and global financial stability standpoint).
16. See generally ANTOINE, supra note 1, IN 3.18-.20 (noting that Caribbean nations are under no
obligation, as sovereign nations, to comply with the United States but do so anyway); Razzano, supra note 2, at
327 (stating that the United States has been successful in eroding confidentiality in offshore financial centers).
17. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 11.35 (concluding that offshore centers will have to retrofit and come
into line with OECD regulations); Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 417 (noting that even though not entirely
successful OECD and international pressure have made the "death of tax havens inevitable").
18. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.03 n.2 (stating that it is convenient to term jurisdictions that engage
in offshore finance as "offshore" versus those jurisdictions that don't as "onshore").
19. See id. 1.18 (defining "offshore" as those jurisdictions that have made the needs of "non-resident
investors" a primary concern of their financial centers).
20. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.13-. 17 (observing the need to redefine the definition of "offshore
financial center" as the world becomes more globalized and offshore centers change).
21. See id., 1.03 n.2 (describing onshore jurisdictions as those jurisdictions that don't participate in
offshore finance).
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term "offshore" is a qualitative term referring to investments located specifically
in foreign jurisdictions where the legislative, regulatory and tax framework is less
restrictive compared to an investor's home-base.22 Many Caribbean nations, in an
attempt to encourage economic growth, have made an effort to attract out-of-
country business by offering favorable taxes and regulations.23 These nations,
which are categorized as offshore financial centers, cater to non-resident
individuals as well as non-resident corporations. 24 For example, the Cayman
Islands and the Bahamas, two of the oldest offshore centers, have very strict
financial confidentiality laws.25
The term "offshore financial center" replaces the term "tax haven" which is
obsolete and portrays offshore jurisdictions as allowing individuals and large
companies to evade taxes.26 An offshore financial center is a "complex creature"
whose focus is on the transnational manner of providing a wide array of financial
and business services for modem businesses and individuals.27 To understand
offshore confidentiality protections fully it is useful to understand global
perspectives towards financial confidentiality.28
A. At Common Law
The importance of banking confidentiality can be traced back to before
Roman times, when temples acted as banks making financial confidentiality vital
to an individual's privacy.29 Banking transactions reflect a person's "lifestyle,
personal interests, and political beliefs. '3° Therefore, access to an individual's
22. Id. In 1.16-.17 (stating that home base is best described as the onshore location where the non-
resident offshore investor resides).
23. See id. 1.14 (noting that the modem offshore financial center provides a wide array of modem
financial services for large transnational companies and small investors).
24. See id. 1.18, 1.22 & n.13 (listing Caribbean financial centers as Panama, Anguilla, Antigua,
Belize, Barbados, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Grenada, the Virgin Islands (United States and British), the
Turks and Caicos Islands, St. Vincent, Costa Rica, Dominica, St. Lucia and the Bahamas).
25. See id. 1.22 & n.13 (discussing the global focus of offshore financial centers and mentioning the
Cayman Islands and the Bahamas as two of the oldest offshore financial centers in the world).
26. See id. ] 1.14-.15 (noting that even though the term "offshore financial center" is difficult to
describe, it has been determined that "tax haven" is obsolete because offshore centers offer such a variety of
services to modem business).
27. See id. (describing offshore financial centers as catering to global clientele rather than just as a haven
for tax evaders); see also id. 1.18. (defining an "offshore financial center" as "a regime which has chosen as a
main or important path to development, legislative, financial and business infrastructure which is more flexible
than orthodox infrastructures, and which caters more specifically, and often exclusively, to the needs of non-
resident investors").
28. See generally ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.01-.07, 2.27-31 (detailing and defining both the limits
and exceptions to offshore confidentiality).
29. See id. 2.04 (discussing the ancient origins of financial confidentiality).
30. Robert S. Pasley, Privacy Rights v. Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement, 6 N.C. BANKING INST.
147, 152-53 (April 2002) (discussing Matthew N. Kleiman, Comment, The Right to Financial Privacy Versus
Computerized Law Enforcement: A New Fight in an Old Battle, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (1992)).
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financial information reveals nearly everything about a person's life.3 On the
other hand, a competing interest which necessitates financial disclosure is the
32apprehension of criminals. Access to financial records allows authorities to
frustrate crime by preventing criminals from conducting transactions in secret
and creating an easily followed paper trail to plundered funds.33
Historically, the common law imposed a duty of confidentiality on banks
regarding financial records of clients. In Tournier v. National Provincial Bank,"
an early English case, the court held that bankers had a contractual duty not to
disclose a client's financial information. The Tournier principle was adopted by
many nations, and expanded to cover areas other than banking. For example, the
United Kingdom and her dependencies have expanded Tournier to covet
commercial transactions.36 Common law courts recognize the importance of
requiring a stringent standard of confidentiality. 7 However, common law
confidentiality is not absolute, as the Tournier case indicates by listing specific
exceptions to the rule.38 Under Tournier, disclosure will be permitted in four
instances: first, under compulsion of law; second, when disclosure is in the public
interest; third, when disclosure is in the best interests of the banker; and fourth,
with express or implied consent by the customer.39
31. See id. at 152-54 (examining the danger of allowing access to an individual's financial history,
which contain intimate details of our lives, such as memberships to organizations, groups, and social causes
supported); see also Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 762 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (summarizing
the danger of disclosure of financial information by stating "[i]f it is true that a man is known by the company
he keeps, then his soul is almost laid bare to the examiner of his checking account").
32. See generally Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAW. 69, 69-70 (1988) (discussing the tension between the
usefulness of using financial information in finding evidence for criminal acts and the need to prevent
disclosure of financial information that may reveal sensitive information).
33. See id. at 69-70 (stating that by accessing records the government is able to find wrongdoers by
following an audit trail); see also Hernandez, supra note 12, at 258 (explaining that the purpose of the Banking
Secrecy Act was to allow authorities to get records of transactions by mandating that banks maintain those
records).
34. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.27 (analyzing the common law duty of confidentiality as a
contractual obligation between banker and client).
35. [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.), available at [1923] WL 17957 (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer); see Pasley, supra note 30, at 174 (discussing Tournier in great detail).
36. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.28 (discussing the expansion of the Tournier concept of
confidentiality); Danforth Newcomb, United States Litigation and Foreign Bank Secrecy: The Origins of the
Conflict, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 49 (1988) (noting that many British dependencies, including
those in the Caribbean, have adopted Tournier-like principles of confidentiality).
37. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284; Tournier, [1924] 1 K.B. 461; see Hernandez,
supra note 12, at 244 (stating that bank secrecy laws demonstrate that strict bank secrecy is "deeply grounded"
in the common law).
38. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 12.27 (noting that Tounier clearly states exceptions when disclosure of
financial information is permitted); Newcomb, supra note 36, at 55 (explaining that the duty of secrecy
established in Tournier is qualified); Pasley, supra note 30, at 174-75 (noting that Tournier, in recognizing strict
confidentiality, limited the duty by stating four exceptions).
39. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 12.27; Pasley, supra note 30, at 174-75.
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Thus, without stringent bank secrecy laws, it appears that under the common
law standard of confidentiality, financial records can be compromised. 4 This is
the very reason why many nations, like offshore financial centers, have enacted
laws to prevent unwarranted disclosure of financial information.4 ' However,
• 41
some nations like the United States have opted for more limited protection
B. The United States
S 41
In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that Fourth Amendment
protection does not extend to bank records that are in the possession of third
parties. Specifically, the court relied on the fact that the Bank Secrecy Act
required banks to maintain records such as copies of checks, deposit slips and
financial statements." The court inferred that the records were the property of the
bank because checks were not personal property but rather instruments of
commercial transactions, and financial statements were voluntarily given over to
the bank.4 ' Therefore, an individual did not have a constitutional right of privacy
over those documents." In response to the decision in Miller, Congress enacted
the Right to Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA") to prevent possible governmental
abuse of individual financial records, and define the extent of financial privacy
rights in the United States. 7
40. See Pasley, supra note 30, at 152-53 (stating the importance of protecting financial records to
prevent revealing personal information); see also Plombeck, supra note 32, at 69 (noting that though financial
information is useful to track criminal transactions there is also a strong need for banking secrecy as
demonstrated in the United States by the Right to Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA")); ANTOINE, supra note 1, In
2.01-07 (explaining that countries that still maintain strict confidentiality laws have either enacted a statutory
framework or have such strong public policy that courts zealously defend it).
41. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.01-.07 (noting that many nations, including Switzerland and many
Caribbean nations, have enacted strict laws to protect financial information); see also Hernandez, supra note 12,
at 235-48 (comparing and contrasting the differences in levels of protection provided by different nations' bank
secrecy laws).
42. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, INTERNATIONAL BANKING: CASES, MATERIAL AND PROBLEMS 357
(1998) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL BANKING] (discussing how the United States has limited financial secrecy
laws); Pasley, supra note 30, at 165-67 (concluding that unlike general privacy rights under the 4th
Amendment, financial privacy rights have been narrowly interpreted and limit the protection given to an
individual's financial privacy); see also Blum, supra note 10, at 41 (stating that the United States is viewed as
the country that seeks disclosure of the most financial information from its banks).
43. See 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976) (involving a bank disclosing financial data to the government
including transactions, checks, and financial statements). Information was used as evidence against Miller,
showing that he was running an illegal alcohol business. Id.
44. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43; see Pasley, supra note 30, at 172-73 (discussing how the court inferred
that if Congress wanted a constitutionally protected interest in financial records it would not have passed the
BSA requiring banks to maintain certain records, which effectively placed ownership of those records with the
bank); Newcomb, supra note 36, at 50 (outlining how the BSA required banks to maintain records where
previously none were needed).
45. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43.
46. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43; see Pasley, supra note 30, at 172-73.
47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2003); see Pasley, supra note 30, at 198 (noting that the RFPA did not
contradict the holding in Miller but merely established safeguards to prevent abuse by the government; thus
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The RFPA was enacted to halt the erosion of financial privacy by providing
when the government could request and when banks could disclose financial
information.4 ' However, any protection that the RFPA promised is illusory for
several reasons. 49For example, the RFPA does not protect the individual when
the bank initiates the disclosures to the government. 50 A bank is allowed to
disclose information without civil liability if it suspects possible statutory or
regulatory violations. ", In addition, actual notice to the customer is limited.
5 2
When formal requests are made, or judicial or administrative subpoenas are
served, the government is required to mail or serve notice to the customer that
day.53 This provides the customer with an opportunity to contest the disclosure. A
contest must be made within ten days of notice or the information is disclosed.54
Moreover, in recent amendments to the RFPA, Congress further restricted
customer notice procedures.55 Finally, the RFPA has provisions concerning
situations where the government can request delayed notice to the individual. 6 In
short, under the RFPA, the United States has narrowly interpreted individual
reinforcing the premise that banks, not individuals, own the financial information, limiting an individual's
privacy rights in those documents).
48. See 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2003) (listing ways that the government can easily gain access to financial
information through: (1) written consent by the customer, (2) search warrant, (3) administrative subpoena, (4)
formal written request [from government], (5) judicial subpoena, or (6) grand jury subpoena); Pasley, supra
note 30, at 172-73 (stating that the RFPA was enacted to halt the erosion of financial privacy due to the contrary
decision in Miller); see also Hernandez, supra note 12, at 245-46 (tracing the evolution of financial
confidentiality protections). The RFPA does not prevent the erosion of financial privacy but does define
exceptions as to when the government can gain access to information. Id.; INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra
note 42, at 357-58 (discussing the history of bank secrecy in the United States, specifically its limits).
49. See Hernandez, supra note 12, at 245-46 (concluding that RFPA does not actually prevent banks
from disclosing information, it only requires notice to the customer prior to disclosing information to the
government).
50. See 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (2003) (noting that a bank can disclose information to the government
without repercussion).
51. See id. § 3403(c) (stating that a bank is not civilly liable for disclosures made, regardless of whether
the transactions were actually in violation of the law); see also Razzano, supra note 2, at 342 (noting that the
RFPA provides that banks can report suspected violations without repercussion).
52. See Hernandez, supra note 12, at 245-46 (critiquing the ease with which banks can disclose
information to the government without civil liability, regardless of whether the transactions were actually in
violation of the law).
53. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3405(2), 3407(2), 3408(4)(A) (2003) (stating when and how much notice the
government must give to customers depending on the type of request).
54. See 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a) (2003) (explaining the procedures for a customer to challenge a disclosure
made to the government).
55. See 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i) (2003) (illustrating limited financial privacy in the United States as banks
are prohibited from giving notice to individuals when a request is made pursuant to a grand jury subpoena or
court order).
56. See 12 U.S.C. § 3409 (2003) (covering specific situations where the investigation is within the
jurisdiction of the government). Situations include when the records are believed to be relevant to a law
enforcement inquiry and there is reason to believe that the inquiry will result in the endangering of life or safety,
flight, destruction of evidence, intimidation of witnesses or otherwise seriously jeopardizing the investigation.
Id.
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protections for financial information 7 This is in stark contrast to strict
confidentiality protections of other nations in the world, namely the offshore financial
centers. 8
C. Offshore Financial Confidentiality
The development of the offshore financial center is "one of the most
significant and fascinating legal and socioeconomic phenomena in contemporary
times."59 Many Caribbean nations have evolved into international banking centers
with strict bank secrecy laws.60 By vigorously guarding privacy and providing for
private investment with little or no tax exposure, Caribbean States are able to
"attract funds, provide jobs and facilitate economic development. ' '6' The policy
decision to enact laws favorable to banking secrecy proved to be advantageous,
62
as the region flourished and became an important banking center.
1. Origins
The Caribbean is perhaps the most successful offshore financial region in the
world, due to its strict banking secrecy laws and its proximity to the United
States and.63  While under European control, many Caribbean States had
agriculturally-based economies, producing a wide range of products from coffee
to sugar cane.64 However, after independence many of these States began to
57. See INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 42, at 357 (discussing how the United States has very
limited financial secrecy laws); Pasley, supra note 30, at 165-67 (stating that unlike general privacy rights under
the 4th Amendment, financial privacy rights have been narrowly interpreted and limit the protection given to an
individual's financial privacy); see also Blum, supra note 10, at 41 (noting that the United States is viewed as
the country that seeks the greatest degree of disclosure of financial information from its banks).
58. See Hernandez, supra note 12, at 249-50 (concluding that the United States places little emphasis on
financial privacy as compared to many other nations, which is the cause of conflict with other jurisdictions); see
also Razzano, supra note 2, at 334, 336 (commenting on the United States' assault on banking secrecy).
59. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.08; see also Ennis, supra note 5, at 642 (discussing the creation of
Caribbean offshore financial centers and their unprecedented growth).
60. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 10, at 41 (commenting on the evolution of Caribbean offshore banking
centers and their strict bank secrecy regulations); Ennis, supra note 5, at 641 (noting that Caribbean offshore
financial centers began after independence as an effort to diversify their economies).
61. Ennis, supra note 5, at 642; see also Paul Jensen & Pam Spikes, Offshore Credit Card Records:
Invasion by the IRS, 29 INT'L TAX J. 59 (2003) (observing that a major selling point for offshore accounts is
their strict bank secrecy laws).
62. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 641-42 (describing the importance and growth of the financial industry in
the Caribbean region using the Cayman Islands as an example). In 1964, the Cayman Islands had only two
banks, but today it is the world's fifth largest financial center. Id.; see also ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.23
(discussing the evolution and growth of the offshore financial sector).
63. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 641 (noting the proximity of many Caribbean offshore centers to the
United States and the reasons behind their development); James, supra note 2, at 10 (tracing the development of
the Caribbean offshore centers).
64. See James, supra note 2, at 9-10 (describing the agricultural products grown to support the colonial
economies of the Caribbean nations).
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diversify as a way to stabilize their economies. 6  This diversification was
necessary because of limiting economic factors such as agricultural decline,
remote location, small populations causing high per capita government costs,
reliance on external trade, susceptibility to natural disasters, and narrow resource
bases.66 From this diversification came tourism and offshore banking.67 Initially, it
was the international community that encouraged Caribbean nations to enter the
offshore financial sector as a means of supplementing their post-colonial
68economies. Ironically, the same industrialized nations that encouraged the
creation of the offshore centers are now attempting to close those centers down.69
Offshore financial centers attract a wealth of business because they have
strict confidentiality rules that appeal to individuals and companies who wish to
reduce their tax liability and withhold information from competitors, suppliers,
creditors and customers for legitimate reasons.70 A number of scenarios created
fertile grounds for the development of offshore banking." First, many of the
existing national banking procedures are in place for individualistic and arbitrary72 7
reasons. This frustrates international business.73  Second, international
regulations currently in place fail to provide transnationa 74 firms with clear
guidelines on how to conduct business across multiple borders. Lastly, the legal
and tax systems of nations often expose transnational companies to duplicativeliablites ad • 76
liabilities and regulations. These factors encourage companies to move offshore
65. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 641 (stating that Caribbean offshore financial centers developed as an
effort to diversify their depressed economies); see also James, supra note 2, at 9-10 (noting that Caribbean
nations attempted to diversify their post colonial economies by creating a tourist and financial market).
66. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 641 (listing the motivations behind many Caribbean nations in creating
financial centers to boost their economies).
67. See James, supra note 2, at 9-10 (commenting on the fact that tourism and finance are the two
money-makers in the Caribbean but the financial sector provides more stability as the hurricanes have damaged
the tourism industry).
68. See id. at 29 (noting that after becoming independent many former colonies were encouraged by
their former masters to boost their economies by entering the financial arena); The Hon. Mia Mottley, Remarks
of the Honorable Mottley, Attorney General & Minister of Home Affairs of Barbados, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 411, 413 (2003) (observing that the United States and European nations encouraged Caribbean nations to
enter into the financial sector); see also Coutin, supra note 9, at 832 (stating that as the agriculture and tourism
industries of post-colonial Caribbean nations declined they had no choice but to enter the financial sector).
69. James, supra note 2, at 29.
70. Ennis, supra note 5, at 642; Blum, supra note 10, at 41.
71. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, In 1.23-.25 (using the theory of an economist named Gorostiaga, who
traced the rise of Caribbean financial centers to increased multinationalism of companies). The author found
that as companies became more internationally focused, the use for offshore banks increased. Id.
72. Id. 1.24.
73. See id. i 1.23-.24 (critiquing "national" financial systems that are not set up to handle the fast paced
and electronic nature of international business). Many national systems have procedures that make it difficult
for international companies to do business. Id.
74. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1225 (10th Ed. 1994)) (defining transnational as
"extending beyond national boundaries").
75. ANTOINE, supra note l,9[ 1.25.
76. See id. IT 1.24-.25 (noting that transnational companies favor using offshore banks as a base for their
transactions, fearing conflict of laws between countries with concurrent jurisdiction over transactions).
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where tax liability is minimal or non-existent, and strict confidentiality gives the
corporations the protections they need." By relocating their businesses offshore,
transnational companies are able to operate with more certainty.
78
2. Confidentiality Models
Compared to the United States and common law standards, offshore financial
centers have more stringent financial confidentiality regulations.7 Jurisdictions
that are protective of financial information can be separated into two types: the
statutory hybrid model and the public policy approach.s
a. Statutory Hybrid Model
The first model is the statutory hybrid model, created by the Swiss.8' This
approach stems from the belief that financial privacy is a fundamental right.s2 It
combines common law banking confidentiality principles, such as the banker-
client relationship, with a comprehensive statutory framework that codifies strict
confidentiality standards.83 In addition, the statutory hybrid model provides
protection from disclosure to both government entities and private citizens. 84
77. See id. (concluding that when faced with duplicative laws, companies opted for moving to offshore
jurisdictions where little or no tax would be charged against them).
78. See id. (stating that as companies became transnational, the uncertainty over which laws applied and
more importantly which country's taxes applied, was remedied by moving operations offshore where favorable
tax regulations and strict confidentiality laws protected the companies' interests).
79. See id. U 2.01-.13 (determining that offshore financial centers that have strict confidentiality have
their roots in the common law, but have evolved either a strong statutory framework or public policy against
disclosure); Hemandez, supra note 12, at 243-45 (stating that many dependencies of the United Kingdom, such
as the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas, have built upon the common law to provide more stringent
confidentiality laws).
80. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.01 (differentiating between common law jurisdictions and two types
of offshore financial centers).
81. See id. 2.02-.03 (noting that in addition to the belief that financial privacy is a fundamental right,
Swiss Banking Law, article 47 creates criminal penalties for breaches of confidentiality). This demonstrates the
strict statutory framework not present in the common law. Id.
82. See Hemandez, supra note 12, at 240 (observing that Switzerland treats the right to financial privacy
as a fundamental right and imposes both civil and criminal penalties for violations); see also INTERNATIONAL
BANKING, supra note 42, at 357 (discussing how many nations, including Switzerland, infer a fundamental
privacy right for financial information); see ANTOINE, supra note 1, IN 2.01-.04 (tracing the historical content of
financial privacy as a fundamental right from Rome to Switzerland and finally the Caribbean).
83. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.03
84. See Peter Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of the United
States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 1, 1-2 (1983) (discussing banking
secrecy specifically article 47 of the Swiss Banking Law and how Switzerland prohibits disclosure to both
public and private sources); see INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 42, at 357 (noting that as Switzerland
views financial privacy as a fundamental right, it applies to disclosures to individuals as well as the
government); see also Hemandez, supra note 12, at 24 (comparing Switzerland's financial protections
regarding banking transactions to a lawyer/client or doctor/patient relationship).
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Like their Swiss counterparts, many Caribbean nations have adopted strict
requirements on disclosure of financial information.8  This is because Caribbean
nations view financial privacy not only as a fundamental right but also an
essential element in sustaining their economy, as offshore economies are
dependent on the viability of their financial sectors." This public policy has
encouraged many Caribbean financial centers to codify the obligation of financial
confidentiality.87 Some Caribbean nations followed the Swiss approach and made the
duty of strict confidentiality a statutory mandate.8 Other Caribbean jurisdictions have
made confidentiality a matter of public policy rather than a statutory duty.89
b. Caribbean Offshore Centers. A Matter of Public Policy
Many offshore financial centers were British colonies and find their secrecy
laws rooted in the common law.9° Several Caribbean jurisdictions such as
Barbados, the British Virgin Islands, and St. Lucia have not codified the duty of
confidentiality.9' Rather, offshore courts in the previously mentioned jurisdictions
recognize strict confidentiality as a matter of public policy and a necessary
foundation of the offshore economy.92  The courts extend the duty of
confidentiality beyond that of the common law.93 The Tournier exceptions to
85. See INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 42, at 357 (discussing how other nations infer a
fundamental privacy right for financial information and from those rights strict bank secrecy laws have
evolved); see also Hernandez, supra note 12, at 245-46 (discussing a Supreme Court case, California Bankers
Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), which held that banks were owners of the individuals financial
information in direct contrast with many jurisdictions with strict bank secrecy where the individual is deemed
the owner of the information); see ANTOINE, supra note 1, ] 2.36-.38 (noting that confidentiality is a vital
ingredient in offshore banking and quoting the legislative purpose behind confidentiality statutes in the Cayman
Islands and the Bahamas was to protect the financial sector).
86. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 641 (discussing the vital importance of strict bank secrecy laws to the
economic viability of many Caribbean nations and how banking confidentiality is protected as a key right by
both criminal and civil law); see also INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 42, at 357 (contrasting the liberal
policies in the United States of gaining access to financial records with the stringent requirements of other
nations).
87. See ANTOINE, supra note I, 2.05 (observing that many offshore financial centers in the Caribbean
have, like Switzerland, codified confidentiality protections); see also Razzano, supra note 2, at 328-29
(discussing the advent of international financial centers and their strict confidentiality requirements prohibit
disclosure under penalty of law).
88. Razzano, supra note 2, at 328-29 (observing that many offshore jurisdictions like the Swiss have
codified their confidentiality protections); ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.05.
89. ANTOINE, supra note 1, T 2.05-.06 (commenting that the British Virgin Islands, St. Lucia and
Barbados have not codified their confidentiality laws but still maintain strict confidentiality).
90. See id. T 2.29 (listing the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands as examples of very successful offshore
financial centers that were former British colonies); see also Newcomb, supra note 36, at 49 (noting that many
former British colonies have adopted common law notions of bank secrecy).
91. Id. 2.06.
92. See id. [ 2.05-.07, 2.29 (stating that even without a statutory framework, several Caribbean nations
have strict financial protections based solely on public policy).
93. ld. 2.29.
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confidentiality are narrowly construed, favoring confidentiality over disclosure.94
The interplay of traditional common law notions of financial privacy, public
policy and statutory law makes Caribbean offshore financial centers a unique
legal environment." Perhaps the best way to understand why many Caribbean
nations view strict confidentiality as a matter of public policy is through their
history .96
11. ATTACKING CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Buccaneer Legends: Myths and Mysteries of the Offshore Financial Center
Strict confidentiality is both the offshore financial center's greatest asset and
greatest enemy.97 On one hand, strict confidentiality is a great tool because secrecy in
business and banking transactions is an important facet of the global economy."
Indeed, levels of investment and consumer confidence within a country are
contingent upon the level of protection accorded to personal financial information.99
Unfortunately, many offshore financial systems are vulnerable to illicit use, and
when confidentiality protections are repeatedly used or allowed to hamper legitimate
law enforcement, public confidence in the judicial system erodes. 'M
Offshore financial centers are widely criticized as specializing in hiding ill-
gotten gains of criminal enterprises.' 1 The U.S. Senate has reported that offshore
financial institutions are "hiding" between $150 and $600 billion dollars in
unreported income.'0 2 Offshore centers are viewed as routinely abusing and misusing
their confidentiality laws to protect tax evaders and criminal enterprises.' 3 A 1985
94. Id. 2.31.
95. Id. 2.06.
96. See id. 11.30 (stating that without their financial sectors, many Caribbean economies would face
certain collapse); see also Coutin, supra note 9, at 832 (noting that without colonial aid, many offshore centers
depend on revenue from their financial centers).
97. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.62
98. Id.; Michael Imeson, Offshore Centers Adapt to Survive, PRIVATE BANKER INT'L 6 (Jan. 17, 2003),
available at 2003 WL 11065075 (detailing the effects of international pressures against offshore banking
confidentiality laws).
99. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.62. (noting the importance of confidentiality to all banking systems
because persons who feel their confidential information is accessible to all, will not trust the financial system).
100. Id.; see also Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money Laundering:
A Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral Policy Reforms, 23
Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 263, 275 (2003) (noting that offshore centers face problems because strict confidentiality
can be used by both legitimate and illegitimate investors).
101. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.53 (commenting on several well known myths regarding offshore
centers); see also S. REP. No. 99-130, supra note 3, at 1.
102. James P. Springer, An Overview of International Evidence and Asset Gathering in Civil and
Criminal Tax Cases, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 277, 281 (1988) (referring to a 1982 Senate report).
103. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.09, 2.53 (discussing that Caribbean offshore jurisdictions are
erroneously viewed as providing protection for criminals under their confidentiality protections); see Lacey,
supra note 103, at 275 (noting that offshore "tax havens" are used by criminals to avoid detection due to those
jurisdiction's strict secrecy laws); see S. REP. No. 99-130, supra note 3, at 1.
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U.S. Senate report noted that "offshore haven secrecy law is the glue that holds many
U.S. criminal organizations together."' 4
The international community, most notably the United States, has sought to
solve this problem by attempting to eradicate offshore confidentiality
protections. '°5 However, eliminating strict banking secrecy laws alone will not
solve the problems of tax evasion and money laundering. °6 The belief that
removing strict confidentiality protections will solve the problem is "false and
simplistic," because the problem does not lie in the presence of strict
confidentiality rules. 0 7 Rather, the problem derives from a "tool kit" of
innovative instruments, such as trusts and bank accounts, and a history of non-
cooperation with the international community in the matters of tax and money
laundering investigations.' 8
The level of illegal activity in offshore banking is greatly overstated and
sensationalized." While some illegal activities do occur offshore, the vast
majority of investors are legitimate." In addition, many offshore centers are well
regulated, have enacted measures to reduce criminal activity and view misuse of
confidentiality as a threat to their economic stability."' In fact, the Bahamian
money laundering statute may be more modern than those of most nations,
including the United States.' 12 Ironically, many nations with highly regulated
banking systems have been victims of elaborate money laundering schemes."3
104. S. REP. No. 99-130, supra note 3, at 1; see Springer, supra note 102, at 280-81 (noting that the
U.S. Senate concluded that crime was flourishing in offshore centers because of strict secrecy laws); but see
ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.63 (commenting on the U.S. hostility to offshore confidentiality and citing a U.S
Senate special report on offshore finance).
105. Razzano, supra note 2, at 334; ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1.04.
106. Blum, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that removing bank secrecy itself will not solve the problem and a
more holistic approach is needed); see ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.53 (commenting on the misperceptions
surrounding offshore confidentiality).
107. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1 2.53.
108. Blum, supra note 10, at 5.
109. ANTOINE, supra note 1, IN 2.54, 2.58.
110. Id.
Ill. See id. In 2.59, 2.61, 11.21 (stating that many Caribbean nations are aware of their reputation as a
haven for criminals and are hostile to potential abuse by criminals); see also Greg Fields, Bahamian Banking
Fears; Archipelago's Valuable Financial Sector Shrinking, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Oct. 28, 2002, at DI 1,
available at 2002 WL 101893282 (noting the sting of international criticism and new regulations on the
offshore financial industry).
112. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 91 6.09 (observing the Bahamas boast of the sophistication of their anti-
money laundering laws in comparison to many onshore jurisdictions).
113. See id. in 2.55-.56, 11.02; Julie Fendo, Attacking the Tools of Corruption: The Foreign Money
Laundering Deterrence and Anticorruption Act of 1999, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1540, 1540-41 (2000)
(discussing widespread money laundering through U.S. banks); James, supra note 2, at 39 (observing that more
dirty money passes through New York and London in a day than the Caribbean combined); see also Nick
Mathiaso, City Slated for Fraud, OBSERVER, Sept. 30, 2001, at I (criticizing London banks for lax regulations);
David Pallister, Ed Harriman & Jamie Wilson, Looted Dollars Ibn Sent Through London, GUARDIAN (London),
Oct. 4, 2003, at I (reporting widespread money laundering throughout London banks); Keith R. Fisher, In Rem
Alternatives to Extradition for Money Laundering, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 409, 419 (2003)
(observing that money launders have become more sophisticated and highly industrialized nations like the
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Nonetheless, offshore financial centers find their confidentiality laws subject
to a two-pronged attack from other nations, most notably the United States.'14 The
first prong is the international attack, headed by the United States, on tax evasion
and unfair tax competition." ' The second prong is a global crackdown upon
money laundering. ' 6 A justification set forth under this prong is that access to
confidential financial information of the institutions where illegal money is
placed would lead law enforcement to the source."7 Thus, the United States and
other nations attempt to break through confidentiality protections under the guise
of pursuing tax evaders and money launderers."8
B. Tax Question
Perhaps the most fervent attack upon offshore financial confidentiality is
stems from a concern over an eroding tax base."9 The offshore financial center's
main attraction, besides strict confidentiality, is a favorable or non-existent tax
rate as compared to the home nation.' 20 Thus, offshore financial centers find
themselves under attack by nations, like the United States, that are attempting to
obtain information about individuals and companies who are allegedly evading
taxes. 12' By playing the tax card, there is an attempt to part the veil of confidentiality
to access information and money protected by strict confidentiality laws.
122
United States and the United Kingdom have fallen victim). Moreover, even the USA PATRIOT Act has not
kept pace with advances in money laundering. Id.
114. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 'lJ 3.01, 6.01 (defining the two major threats to offshore confidentiality
as tax and money laundering initiatives); see also INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 42, at 373; Razzano,
supra note 2, at 327 (commenting on the United States' ongoing attack on offshore secrecy); Lacey, supra note
100, at 276 (noting that the United States, prior to the September l1th attacks, began attacking offshore
confidentiality using both tax evasion and money laundering as justifications).
115. James, supra note 2, at 2-3; ANTOINE, supra note 1, 3.01; Kimberly Carlson, When Cows Have
Wings: An Analysis of the OECD's Tax Haven Work as It Relates to Globalization, Sovereignty and Privacy, 35
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 163, 164 (2002).
116. See Todd Doyle, Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactics
Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 279 (2002) (referring to a 1990 report from the
FATF that an estimated $85 billion in drug proceeds were available for laundering).
117. Ennis, supra note 5, at 640.
118. Razzano, supra note 2, at 327.
119. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, V 10.52; see also Jensen, supra note 61, at I (concluding that the IRS
has targeted offshore bank accounts in attempts to recoup lost revenue).
120. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1 .25; Blum, supra note 10, at 39.
121. See id. In 3.01-.02; Razzano, supra note 2, at 335 (noting the strict that the United States has
passed laws to prevent the use of offshore financial centers).
122. See id. 3.02; S. REP. No. 99-130, supra note 3, at 2 (commenting on the serious problem of tax
evasion and offshore financial centers).
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In addition, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD")' has launched attacks upon the viability of offshore financial centers
by claiming that centers which provide favorable or non-existent taxes are
engaging in unfair tax competition.'24 The attacks upon offshore confidentiality
under the guise of tax regulations have a two-fold purpose.' 25 By attacking
confidentiality, nations not only attempt to gain access to financial records of
supposed tax evaders, but also hope to make investments with offshore financial
centers unattractive by disassembling the confidentiality framework.' 26
Measures taken by nations to fight tax evasion in offshore holdings are
varied and focus on undermining offshore confidentiality.' 27 These initiatives
range from general plans that monitor onshore businesses and individuals that do
business offshore to more specific measures that target offshore financial centers
themselves.' 28  For example, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") pressures
onshore parties by increasing reporting requirements on those who utilize
offshore centers. By establishing detailed reporting requirements, such as
reporting foreign bank accounts and shares in companies and trusts, the IRS
hopes to gather information on offshore assets. 29 Accordingly, problems arise
when onshore extra-jurisdictional tax investigations conflict with the
confidentiality protections of the offshore jurisdiction.'3°
123. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL TAx
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 16 (1998), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf) (last
visited Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter OECD 1998 Report] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (describing the
creation of the OECD in 1961 as an international organization to promote global economic growth and expansion of
multilateral trade).
124. See James, supra note 2, at 2-3 (noting that in April 1998, OECD launched an attack on several
Caribbean nations in regards to unfair tax competition); see also Ben Sessel, The Bermuda Reinsurance
Loophole: A Case Study of Tax Shelters and Tax Havens in the Globalizing Economy, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 541, 565-66 (2001) (commenting on the controversial nature of OECD's actions in declaring several
Caribbean financial centers as participating in unfair tax competition); Lacey, supra note 100, at 275.
125. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 3.01-.02 (commenting that both individual nations and the
international community strive to recover lost taxes and prevent future avoidance).
126. Id.
127. Id. (] 3.35-37.
128. Id. i 3.37-.38.
129. See Razzano, supra note 2, at 359-62 (noting that each taxpayer is required to report existence of
foreign bank accounts in excess of $10,000). Ideally, the IRS can learn of new offshore accounts and begin
investigations. Id. Also, there are a variety of additional requirements that the IRS places on taxpayers to
disclose information. Id.
130. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 3.16 (observing that offshore jurisdictions are under no obligation to
disclose information to onshore authorities); see also Daniel Drezner, On Balance Between International Law
and Democratic Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 329 (2001) (noting that the United States and the European
Union have used international law to violate the sovereignty of other nations).
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1. It's My Island: The Interplay of Comity 3' and Sovereignty 1 2
As sovereign nations, offshore financial centers in the Caribbean are under
no duty to aid onshore tax authorities in recovering taxes from funds deposited
offshore.' 33 It is recognized that one sovereign nation has no duty to enforce the
judgments of another nation.'34 In fact, in two cases, one involving the Cayman
Islands and the other the Bahamas, the courts stated that a sovereign nation is
under no obligation to execute the laws of another country.'
35 While this
statement sounds impressive, the reality of the situation is that the modem trend
is moving towards relaxing the strict standards of confidentiality and allowing
disclosure in specific instances. For example, the Cayman Islands has relaxed
its position, and now permits disclosure when a sufficient reason is provided.'
37
This is not to say Caribbean courts do not scrutinize disclosure requests to
determine if they are legitimate and not just "fishing expeditions."'38 In instances
where offshore courts determine that disclosure goes against public policy,
release of information will not be allowed.'3 9 It appears that offshore courts are
using the principle of comity, a standard that allows sovereign nations to resolve
issues when conflicts of laws occur.' 40 The application of comity dictates that the
jurisdiction with the more important justification should prevail.' 4' For offshore
jurisdictions, where strict confidentiality is a matter of public policy and often a
matter of law, the issue of making disclosures based on an onshore nation's
131. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 261-62 (7th ed. 1999) (defining comity as courtesy among political
entities; such as nations, states or courts of different jurisdictions; especially mutual recognition of legislative,
executive and judicial acts); see also ANTOINE, supra note 1, 10.03 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
164 (1894) that comity is often defined as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws").
132. See Drezner, supra note 130, at 323 (defining sovereignty as the power endowed in a government
to "regulate its affairs of a well defined territory and its resident population without interference from
organizations or individuals external to that jurisdiction").
133. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 3.16 (stating that tax regulations of one country are the business of
that country and there is no obligation to enforce regulations of other countries); see also Whitney Whisenhunt,
To Zedillo or Zedillo: Why the World Needs an ITO, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 541, 556 (2002) (observing
that taxation is a matter of sovereignty).
134. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 3.16.
135. See id. 3.17 (quoting from Stutts v. Premeir Capital Trust [1992-93] CILR 605 a Cayman Islands
case and Re Lambert and Pinto, Sup. Ct., Bahamas, Case No. 962 of 1986, per Strachan J. a Bahamas case, in
both cases the courts denied access to records based on sovereignty).
136. See id. IN 3.43-.48 (discussing the trend in several Caribbean nations to allow disclosure of
financial records in response to requests for tax enforcement purposes).
137. See id. 3.48, 4.33-.35 (quoting sufficient reason as "at least specific and provable allegations of
civil and criminal wrongdoing").
138. See id. (exploring methods of disclosure for many Caribbean nations); see also ANTOINE, supra
note 1, at chs. 4-6 (discussing in detail disclosure in offshore financial centers).
139. Id. [3.46.
140. Id. [ 10.01-.04.
141. Id. V9 10.04-.05.
2004 / Fatal Broadside
legitimate interest may not be that simple.' As a result, offshore courts must
tread carefully, especially in jurisdictions where there are civil or criminal
penalties for disclosure. 4 3 Offshore courts' strict scrutiny of onshore requests for
disclosure ensures that onshore justifications for disclosure are related to crime
prevention rather than mere tax purposes.'" It is evident that the shield of
offshore confidentiality has suffered some cracks as the United States and other
nations directly attack its "raison d' tre."'
5
2. The United States
The IRS has estimated that the United States loses $70 billion a year in
revenue from investments and monies placed in offshore financial centers.146
When combined with the revenue lost from other nations, it is understandable
that there is a concerted effort to access confidential financial information in
'47order to recover that revenue. For example, the IRS is eager to gain access to
offshore bank records because much of the evidence of alleged violations are
likely to be held in offshore financial centers. ,48 In fact, many IRS investigations
go nowhere when the offshore jurisdictions fail to disclose critical evidence
needed to obtain convictions and recover revenue.' 49 The United States, realizing
the difficulty in accessing confidential information through offshore courts, has
focused on entering into bilateral tax treaties with offshore financial centers,
circumventing the sovereignty issue altogether. ,0
142. Id.
143. Id. ([ 10.05, 10.07.
144. Id. 3.23,4.35.
145. See Drezner, supra note 130, at 329 (noting that the United States has used a variety of means to
get its way in the international arena including treaties, custom, and coercion); Are All Trusts Suspect? Of All
the Products, I'NTL MONEY MKTG. (Nov. 8, 2002), available at 2002 WL 11697654.
146. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 4, at 13; Jensen, supra note 61, at 4; Debra B. Treyz & Anthony E.
Woods, Recent Developments in International Anti-Money Laundering and Tax Harmonization Initiatives, SG
018 ALI-ABA 443, 446 (Oct. 4-5, 2001) (quoting an exchange between Senator Carl Levin and Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neil); Lacey, supra note 100, at 275-76.
147. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, IN 2.63-.64; Razzano supra note 2, at 359.
148. Springer, supra note 102, at 283; ANTOINE, supra note 1, fJ 3.37-.38.
149. See Springer, supra note 102, at 283 (citing a 1987 Senate report that noted that between 1978 and
1983 the IRS was forced to drop 36 cases due to evidentiary problems when denied access to offshore
accounts); see also ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.66 (commenting on the problems onshore tax authorities have in
recovering revenue held offshore).
150. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 9 3.101 (noting that mutual assistance treaties have the greatest
potential for "whittling away" offshore confidentiality).
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The United States has had some difficulty negotiating tax treaties with
nations because its tax policy is rather inflexible. 5 ' However, on the whole, U.S.
efforts in entering into tax treaties with other nations have been successful.' 2
Some treaties allow disclosure on a showing by the United States that the
individual "took affirmative action on the likely effect which was to mislead or
conceal."'53 Others, like a pending treaty with the Cayman Islands, require the
United States to state the reason for the request, and the Cayman Islands reserve
the right to refuse the request if it violates public policy or any privilege.'5 4 On
the other hand, Bermuda has agreed to disclose information without requiring
"reasonable grounds" that the transaction or party is involved with a tax
investigation. 55 Although it appears that offshore confidentiality protections are
still intact the United States through treaties, has been able to ensure disclosure
'56for tax matters.
There are also some drawbacks with tax treaties. For instance, small or
developing nations lack the resources or bargaining power to effectively
negotiate and ratify treaties. 7 One possible solution is to create an International
Taxation Organization ("ITO") which would apply multilaterally to all countries,
rather than bilaterally between nations. 58 An ITO could deal with global tax
issues in a less coercive environment, allowing smaller nations to have more of a
say without fearing pressure from larger, more industrialized nations.'5 9 Thus,
151. See Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too
Many Sticks and No Carrots, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 331, 331-32 (2003) (concluding that the United
States is inflexible in its tax policy and would get a better response if they provided incentives rather than
disincentives).
152. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, IN 3.101-.05 (describing the effectiveness of treaties between the
United States and several Caribbean nations).
153. See id. 3.102 (noting that the Antigua agreement allows Antigua to refuse requests if there is no
legitimate purpose in requesting the information); see also Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Antigua and Barbuda For the Exchange of Information With Respect
to Taxes, Dec. 6, 2001, U.S.-Ant. & Barb., WORLDWIDE TAX TREATIES DoC. 2001-30385, art. 4 § 4d-e,
[hereinafter Antigua & Barbuda Treaty] (stating that Antigua can refuse to disclose information it deems in
violation of public policy or tax law).
154. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Including the Government of the Cayman Islands, for
the Exchange of Information Relating to Taxes, Nov. 27, 2001, U.S.-Cayman Is., WORLDWIDE TAX TREATIES
Doc. 2001-29858, art. 2 (pending) [hereinafter Cayman Treaty].
155. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 3.105; see Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas For the Provision of Information With
Respect to Taxes and for Other Matters, Jan 25, 2002, U.S.-Bah., WORLDWIDE TAX TREATIES Doc. 2002-2120,
art. 2 § 3 [hereinafter Bahamas Treaty] (pending) (stating grounds for disclosure regarding tax matters should be
"framed with the greatest degree of specificity as possible").
156. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, in 3.101-.05; see, e.g., Antigua & Barbuda Treaty, supra note 153, at
art. 4 § 4d-e; Bahamas Treaty, supra note 155, at art. 2 § 3; Cayman Treaty, supra note 154, art. 4.
157. Whisenhunt, supra note 133, at 547; see Zagaris, supra note 151, at 331-32 (noting that the United
States does not provide many incentives for countries to enter into tax treaties).
158. See Whisenhunt, supra note 133, at 556-57 (discussing the advantages of multilateral treaties
versus bilateral ones, for example, increased cooperation).
159. Id.; Carlson, supra note 115, at 186.
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with an ITO in place more nations would cooperate, as there would be a forum to
address their concerns.' 6 As a result, the United States and international
organizations could fortify their relationships with many smaller nations. 6
3. The International Community
The international community has made a concerted effort to undermine
offshore confidentiality on the basis of unfair tax competition. 62 By attacking
confidentiality, the OECD and Financial Action Task Force ("FATF") seek to
prevent financial crimes, such as money laundering and tax evasion. 63 For
example, the main concern of the OECD is that tax competition has a potential to
distort trade and investments and erode national tax bases' 4 To deal with this
concern, the OECD blacklists nations when they are deemed non-compliant with
OECD regulations. ' 65 To accomplish this task, the OECD first determines if the
nation offers low or no taxes; next the OECD determines if this low tax rate is
unavailable to local residents; then the OECD examines the nation's tax structure
to see if there is sufficient transparency; finally the OECD considers whether the
jurisdiction in question exchanges information with other nations. '6 However,
upon close examination it is evident that the real issue is financial competition
and the erosion of national tax bases. 6 A 1998 OECD report addressed the
concern that small countries were able to take substantial capital from larger,
more industrial nations by offering a more favorable or non-existent tax rate.168
160. See id. (predicting increased cooperation as small nations left out of previous treaties would now be
able to state their concerns regarding any given policy).
161. Whisenhunt, supra note 133, at 157.
162. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, In 3.96, 11.02 (noting that OECD's main target is offshore
confidentiality even though supposedly focused on unfair tax competition); James, supra note 2, at 2-3;
Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 393-94; Alexander Townsend, Jr., The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisationfor Economic Co-Operation and Development's Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 215 (2001); Sessel, supra note 124, at 565.
163. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1 11.01 (asserting that the FATF and the OECD are "sibling"
organizations focused on the same goal of preventing financial crime by attacking confidentiality); Hartman,
supra note 15, at 263-64 (stating that international community uses coercion to force offshore centers to
cooperate); Fields, supra note 11, at DII (commenting on recent international regulations and their disastrous
effect on offshore centers).
164. OECD 1998 Report, supra note 123, at 16 (listing potential harms of allowing harmful tax competition);
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., TOwARDs GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND
ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACnrCE, Page 5 (2000), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf (last
visited Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter OECD 2000 Report] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reiterating the
findings of the 1998 report); see ANTOINE, supra note 1, 11.14; Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 393.
165. ANTOINE, supra note 1, at 11.12; James, supra note 2, at 3-4.
166. OECD 1998 Report, supra note 123, at 25-35 (detailing the factors used in defining jurisdictions
with harmful tax competition); see ANTOINE, supra note 1, 11.06; James, supra note 2, at 12.
167. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1 2.55-.56, 11.02 (noting that the true reason behind the OECD and
FATF attacks is about competition and taxes as demonstrated by the fact that onshore banks have been the
major targets of money laundering and terrorist financing).
168. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 11.02-.03; see James, supra note 2, at 3-4 (describing the 1998 OECD
Report); Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 393. (detailing the effects of OECD regulations).
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The OECD report suggested that the global community should coordinate to
"rigorously and consistently" use current tools and new procedures to prevent
onshore tax base erosion."69 Subsequently, a 2000 OECD report specifically
targeted Caribbean offshore centers by listing them as non-compliant.17 In order
to get off the list, "blacklisted" nations need to comply with nineteen different
items including signing tax treaties, exchanging information, and changing
domestic policy.'7 ' This requirement illustrates the hostile position the
international community has taken towards Caribbean offshore centers and its
stringent banking confidentiality policies.
7
1
4. The Caribbean Reaction
The Caribbean community responded negatively to the 1998 OECD report,
as it threatened the stability of the Caribbean community's financial reputation.'73
Without a viable offshore sector, many Caribbean nations would not be able to
sustain their economies. 74 To make matters worse, a 2000 OECD report listed
several defensive countermeasures that onshore jurisdictions could use to defend
their tax bases, including not allowing deductions related to non-compliant
jurisdictions, increasing reporting requirements, withholding taxes on payments
to residents of those jurisdictions, not entering or terminating tax treaties with
non-cooperating jurisdictions, and adding charges to transactions with non-
compliant jurisdictions. 1' The founding members of the OECD possess
tremendous economic clout.'76 Conversely, small offshore nations lack the
political or economic strength to withstand such a barrage.177 Consequently, it is
not a surprise that many offshore centers have either complied with the OECD
169. OECD 1998 Report, supra note 123, at 37.
170. OECD 2000 Report, supra note 164, at 16-17 (listing jurisdictions that are non-compliant);
Hishikawa, supra note 10, at 395-96; James, supra note 2, at 4; see ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1 11.01 (noting that
the OECD has singled out confidentiality protections of offshore financial centers as its main target).
171. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 11.09; OECD 2000 Report, supra note 164, at 7 (referring to
recommendations listed in OECD 1998 Report).
172. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1 1 l.12; James, supra note 2, at 5-6; Sullivan, supra note 4, at 13.
173. See James, supra note 2, at 4; ANTOINE, supra note l, 111.25.
174. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 11.30 (commenting on offshore dependence on the financial sector);
James, supra note 2, at 9-10 (tracing the reasons behind the development of Caribbean offshore finance);
Coutin, supra note 9, at 832 (stating that as Caribbean nations no longer derive income from their colonial
parents they need the offshore sector to sustain their economies); Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 401 (noting that
Caribbean nations fear that crackdowns will damage their economies); Peter Richards, Leader Urges Pullout
From Offshore Banking Forum, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 27, 2003, available at 2003 WL 66986136 (noting
that a northern initiative could destroy offshore confidentiality).
175. See OECD 2000 Report supra note 164, at 24-5 (listing possible defensive measures that can be
used as an approach to eliminating harmful tax competition).
176. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 11.25; Townsend, supra note 162, at 217-18; Richards, supra note 174;
Hartman supra note 15, at 255-56; Carlson, supra note 115, at 178-79.
177. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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regulations or at least opened channels of communication. '  It appears that
confidentiality's greatest weakness is the coercive efforts by the global
community to "name and shame" offshore centers into compliance.'7 9 If this trend
continues, offshore centers will have no choice but to bow to international
pressure, potentially ending confidentiality as we know it.'8°
C. Money Laundering
Money laundering can be defined as "the process by which one conceals the
existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income and then disguises that
income to make it appear legitimate in the open economic market."' 8 ' Money
laundering has received a lot of attention in the past twenty-five years because it
is a global problem affecting financial institutions in every country.'82 It is
estimated that each year criminals launder about $300 billion in the United States
alone.'83 Thus, money laundering not only undermines public trust in banks and
financial centers, but also endangers the stability of nations.'" By attacking
money laundering transactions, authorities can cripple criminal organizations and
identify and apprehend the heads of organized crime networks.'85 Also, tracking
money laundering activity is much easier than discovering the underlying crimes
that create the smuggled currency.86
178. See Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 411-12 (observing that both Bermuda and the Caymans have been
removed from the OECD's list, Aruba; Barbuda and Antigua have made commitments to the OECD and the
Bahamas, Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos are expected to make
commitments soon).
179. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1 11.12; Mottley, supra note 68, at 414.
180. See Antoine supra note 1, T 11.35; Hishikawa, supra note 9 at 417 (stating international pressures
have made the "death of tax havens inevitable"); see also Mottley, supra note 68, at 413-15 (commenting on
how Caribbean offshore centers are constantly having their confidentiality protections bombarded by onshore
jurisdictions); Richards, supra note 174 (tracing the onslaught on offshore confidentiality).
181. Lacey, supra note 100, at 267; see, e.g., Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the
Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 144 (1995); Fisher supra note 113, at 428-29.
182. Id. at 145; see Ennis supra note 5, at 640-41 (commenting on the global scope of money laundering
concerns, and attempts to combat money laundering); Hitesh Patel, Analysis-Money Laundering-Dirty
Money, ACCOUNTANCY, July 10, 2003, at 64, available at 2003 WL 60211236. (commenting on the global
scale of money laundering).
183. Sultzer, supra note 181, at 146.
184. See Fisher supra note 113, at 416-17 (determining that money laundering has disastrous social
consequences and is a threat to a nation's security); S. REP. No. 99-130, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that money
laundering destabilizes the economy by eroding public confidence in the justice system and preventing the
collection of taxes on large sums of money); see also Lacey, supra note 100, at 268-69 (stating that money
laundering has many negative effects including harming global economic welfare). The actions of Ferdinand
Marcos, former president of the Philippines, and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, demonstrate the crippling effect
money laundering can have on a nation. Id.
185. See Sultzer, supra note 181, at 145 (observing that money laundering is the "life blood" of criminal
organizations).
186. See id. at 147 (noting that often launderers are separated from the underlying crimes that produce
the funds); Plombeck, supra note 32, at 69 (describing how discovery of financial proceeds of a crime can lead
back to those who participated in the crime).
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1. Mechanics
The mechanics of money laundering involve placing funds obtained from
illegal activity into legitimate financial systems without disclosing their origin. '
A money launderer takes three steps to clean illicit funds: placement, layering
and integration. 18 In activities that produce large amounts of cash, the trick is to try
and "place" or deposit the money into a bank without alerting the government.
89
Next, the money is wire-transferred to many different bank accounts around the
world.' 9° This helps hide the origin of the illicit booty. 9' As there are huge numbers
of wire transfers each day, it is very difficult to trace a specific transfer back to the
source.' The final step is to take the transferred funds and integrate them into the
economy by purchasing real estate and other assets or investing in businesses.' 93
2. Counter Measures
a. The United States
In the late 1970s, the United States began attacking offshore financial
confidentiality in response to an escalating drug problem.' 94 Offshore financial
centers were viewed as providing drug dealers with a safe and anonymous way to
launder their illicit funds.'95 Congress sought to take the profit from the drug trade
by preventing this process.' 96 By accessing records of transactions, authorities can
follow an "audit trail" to the criminal organization.' 9 Thus began the United
States' ongoing assault on the bastions of offshore financial confidentiality. ' "
Anti-money laundering statutes passed by Congress focus on detecting
potentially illegal transactions at the placement stage.'99 This is because the funds
187. See Johnathan P. Straub, The Prevention of E-Money Laundering: Tracking the Elusive Audit Trail,
25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 515, 517-19 (2002) (describing the money laundering process in detail).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 517-18.
190. Id. at 518-19.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 517-19.
193. Id. at 519.
194. See Razzano, supra note 2, at 334 (tracing the history of the U.S. attack on offshore financial
confidentiality); U.S. Money Laundering Laws: Overview, 1, at http://www.moneylaundefing. com/MLLaws.htm (last
visited 11/13/2003) [hereinafter Money Laundering Overview] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
195. Razzano, supra note 2, at 334.
196. Id.
197. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 640-41 (defining an audit or paper trail as documentation that allows
law enforcement to trace a deposit back to an individual or company to determine its legitimacy).
198. Razzano, supra note 2, at 334.
199. Lacey, supra note 100, at 290; Fendo, supra note 113, at 1545-46.
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are more easily traced when they are closer to the original source of the
200transactions.
The United States requires that financial institutions0 ' record transactions
when more than $10,000 is deposited or withdrawn from an account during a 24
202hour period. Institutions are also required to record any transactions "to,
203through or by" another financial institution. Moreover, financial institutions are
required to report suspicious activities involving $5,000 or more.2' Furthermore,
individuals must declare monies in excess of $10,000 that they transport across
U.S. borders, or face seizure of the funds. 205 U.S. citizens must also declare the
possession of any foreign bank account.Y0
Additional statutes give the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
("FinCEN") 207 the ability to require financial institutions to execute anti-money
laundering programs and procedures. 8 These "know your customer" rules
require that banks make a reasonable effort to determine the identity of customers
and ownership of accounts.2 °9 In mandating these steps, the United States has
taken an aggressive approach to the prevention of money laundering by
increasing record keeping and disclosure requirements of certain transactions.2 0
The United States has applied money laundering statutes with efficiency,
freezing both domestic and international assets of large banks that have
committed money laundering violations.2 ' In one such case, the U.S. government
froze $80 billion in accounts across the globe from a bank that allegedly received
200. Id.
201. See Razzano, supra note 2, at 337-38 (defining "financial institution" as including banks,
broker/dealers, investment companies, insurance companies, loan/finance companies, telegraph companies or
businesses defined as such by the Secretary of the Treasury).
202. See Lacey, supra note 100, at 295; see also Razzano, supra note 2, at 334-51 (examining the
history of U.S. legislation concerning bank secrecy).
203. See Razzano, supra note 2, at 337 (stating that U.S. statutes require documentation of monies
transferred to a bank, through a bank, or from a bank). So even those transactions that merely pass through a
bank must be disclosed. Id.; Lacey, supra note 100, at 295-96.
204. See Lacey, supra note 100, at 296-97; see also Razzano, supra note 2, at 338, 342 (giving examples
of suspicious behavior, such as unknown sources of money or unknown individuals making deposits).
205. See Lacey, supra note 100, at 297 (noting that failure to declare monies of $10,000 risks forfeiture
of those monies when crossing U.S. borders).
206. Id.
207. See Razzano, supra note 2, at 343 (observing that FinCEN was created in 1990 by the Department
of Treasury to combat money laundering).
208. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, T 6.15; see also Razzano, supra note 2, at 343 (discussing the potential
effect of more thorough disclosure requirements).
209. See Lacey, supra note 100, at 290-91 (stating that prior to September 11, 2001 there was extreme
resistance to continued efforts to expand disclosure requirements); Razzano, supra note 2, at 334, 343
(commenting on the United States' continued attacks on confidentiality and the push to expand disclosure
requirements).
210. See Razzano, supra note 2, at 343-44.
211. See id. at 350 (demonstrating an example where the United States effectively shut down a bank, in
the Banko De Occidente case, due to violations of money laundering laws).
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and laundered drug money originating from the United States.22 Banks that
violate money laundering statutes face significant fines or criminal penalties.
213
This demonstrates the serious repercussions of participating in money laundering
and the long reach of U.S. enforcement.24 Offshore financial centers also face
international pressure in response to money laundering concerns." '
b. The International Community
In the late 1980s, upon recognizing the need for money laundering policies,
the international community created the FATF.2 6 The FATF is made up of
experts and policymakers charged with creating anti-money laundering policy
and reviewing international compliance.27 In 1990, the FATF drafted forty
recommendations as a blueprint for nations to follow to create effective policies
to combat money laundering.1 s These recommendations encourage countries to
adopt various provisions with regard to financial institutions, including increased
due diligence requirements, reporting of suspicious transactions, and mutual
assistance with other nations regarding money laundering investigations.219
Furthermore, the recommendations provide that financial institutions of nations
that fail to comply should have their transactions given "special attention., 220 This
veiled threat is consistent with the international community's current attitude of
221hostility towards offshore financial centers.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.; Hernandez, supra note 12, at 250 (describing the extra-jurisdictional reach of U.S money-
laundering enforcement); see also Money Laundering Overview, supra note 194, at 3 (noting that the United
States has extra-territorial jurisdiction over some transactions).
215. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Basic Facts on Money Laundering (2003),
at http://www.l.oecd.org/fatf/MLaundering-en.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Basic Facts on
Money Laundering] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (describing the international response to the
problem of money laundering including the FATF and the United Nations).
216. Id. at 6; Straub, supra note 187, at 526-27; Fisher supra note 113, at 432; see supra notes 162-63
and accompanying text (discussing the interrelated nature of international organizations that are attacking
offshore banking confidentiality, and illustrating that attacks are not limited to any one organization but a
concerted international effort).
217. Basic Facts on Money Laundering, supra note 215; Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, The Forty Recommendations (June 20, 2003), at http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/40Recs_ en.htm#Forty
[hereinafter Forty Recommendations].
218. Forty Recommendations, supra note 217. The introduction to the Forty Recommendations
describes how the original recommendations were drawn up in 1990 and updated in 1996. Id.
219. Id. at2,5-6, 10-11.
220. See id. at 7 (providing measures to be taken in response to non-compliant nations). However, the
Forty Recommendations fail to define what constitutes "special attention." Id.
221. ANTOINE, supra note 1, In 11.12,11.30; Townsend, supra note 162, at 217-18 (discussing he
pressure on developing nations to comply with industrialized standards).
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The FATF has been effective in coercing offshore jurisdictions into adopting
its regulations. 22 By labeling nations as non-cooperative, the FATF ensures that
offshore jurisdictions follow its recommendations. 223 Failing to comply with the
FATF recommendations can have disastrous effects upon the economy of an
offshore center.224 In fact, the United Kingdom has encouraged the FATF to
"name and shame" nations that failed to comply with FATF procedures.225 For
example, in 1999 Antigua suffered a financial drought when the United States
and the United Kingdom issued financial institutions in Antigua an advisory
warning, recommending closer scrutiny for transactions.226 This illustrates the
immense international pressure that offshore centers must comply with or risk
facing sanctions.27 Because of the increasing pressure from both the United
States and the international community, it is imperative for Caribbean offshore
financial centers to comply in order to ensure that their economies stay afloat.
28
c. The Caribbean Reaction
Most Caribbean offshore financial centers have responded positively to both
U.S and international concerns regarding money laundering. 229 These centers
realize that their economies need funds derived from offshore business.230 Any
222. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 647 (describing in detail the coercive efforts of the international
community to ensure that offshore centers comply with new regulations); James, supra note 2, at 50
(commenting on the OECD's bullying tactics to make Caribbean offshore centers comply).
223. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 651-52 (noting that the Bahamas rapidly updated its money laundering
policies when the FATF labeled it non-cooperative in 2000); see also Hot-Money Havens Blacklisted,
AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., June 24, 2000, at 9 (stating that sixteen countries toughened their banking rules in an
attempt to stay off the blacklist).
224. Ennis, supra note 5, at 649; see James, supra note 2, at 38 (noting that nations blacklisted by the
OECD and the FATF face economic hardship).
225. Id. at 647.
226. Id. at 649.
227. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.01 (stating that the FATF and the OECD have targeted
confidentiality as a barrier to both money laundering and tax investigations); Ennis, supra note 5, at 649
(observing that small nations with large financial sectors cannot afford to fail to comply with the international
community); Doyle, supra note 116, at 308-09 (concluding that though questionable, the FATF's threat of
sanctions could have serious detrimental effects on the global flow of capital).
228. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 649, 651-52 (noting that the Bahamian reaction to being blacklisted was
to immediately comply); see also ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.76; (observing that many offshore jurisdictions
have responded to concerns regarding money laundering by enacting statutes); Coutin, supra note 9, at 832
(illustrating that Caribbean nations are very aware of the precarious nature of their economies).
229. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.76; (remarking that many offshore jurisdictions enacted statutes in
response to concerns regarding money laundering); see also DENIS A. KLEINFELD & EDWARD J. SMITH,
LANGER ON PRACTICAL TAX PLANNING § 6:3.3 (Practising Law Institute 2001) (mentioning that Antigua has
signed treaties and increased disclosures amidst allegations of money laundering); Imeson, supra note 98, at 6
(claiming that the Cayman Islands are cooperating with international regulations); Press Release, Office of the
Financial Secretary Cayman Islands, IMF Team Arrives for Review of Financial Services Industry (Sept. 29,
2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that private banks have responded to new
regulations).
230. ANTOINE, supra note 1, T 11.30; Fields, supra note 11, at DII (illustrating that in the Bahamas
income from banking is second only to tourism).
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illegal activity, such as money laundering, is a far more serious threat to the
economic stability of offshore centers than anything else.23 These nations realize
that not only will they come under attack from the United States and the
international community, but also any practices that encourage money laundering
will drive away legitimate investors. 32 Therefore, most offshore centers are well
regulated and view misuse of confidentiality as a threat to their economic
stability.233
IV. PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS: THE USA PATRIOT ACT'S DEVASTATING
ATTACK ON OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CONFIDENTIALITY
The horrific events of September 11, 2001, triggered the latest U.S. and
international crackdown on offshore financial confidentiality.234 Though loosely
associated with money laundering prior to the September 1lth attacks, terrorist
financing has become the focus of many money laundering statutes and
investigations.13 Naturally, as the United States and the world demand more
stringent banking regulations and wider disclosures, offshore centers are the
immediate focus of attention. 6 The reality is that terrorist financing is a global
problem. 37 In fact, terrorists laundered most of their monies through onshore
financial center, such as London.23 Nonetheless, the United States and the
international community have passed resolutions as well as statutes, and have
conducted themselves in a manner that will inevitably shatter offshore
confidentiality protections. 239 The USA PATRIOT Act is the latest weapon for
the United States in its war on offshore confidentiality.24
231. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, in 2.58, 4.09, 11.30 (stating that many Caribbean nations are aware of
the potential economic disaster that would accompany any labeling by the FATF); see also Ennis, supra note 5,
at 649 (demonstrating the impact of a mere advisory on offshore economies and how quickly Antigua
responded); Kleinfeld, supra note 229, para. 1 (noting Antigua's prompt compliance to money laundering
regulations after allegations); Coutin, supra note 9, at 832 (describing that Caribbean nations are very aware of
the precarious nature of their economies).
232. See Sultzer, supra note 181, at 203 (observing that both Panama and the Bahamas lost many
legitimate investors due to involvement in money laundering and corruption); James, supra note 2, at 38-39
(concluding that the OECD and the FATF blacklisting results in a decline of offshore economies).
233. ANTOINE, supra note 1, [ 2.61; see supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing offshore
financial regulations).
234. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 12.4A (2004) [hereinafter BANKING
LAW]; ANTOINE, supra note 1, U 6.69-.71 (discussing terrorism as an impetus for a crackdown on money
laundering); see generally Ilias Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 315,
328-29 (2003).
235. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.69-.71.
236. See id. 6.71; Andres Rueda, International Money Laundering Law Enforcement & The USA
PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 10 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 141, 183 (2001) (discussing how the Patriot Act makes
money laundering enforcement an international issue).
237. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.55-.56, 6.71 (providing an example of money being funneled from
Russia).
238. Id. 12.56.
239. See Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 417 (noting that even though not entirely successful, the OECD
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A. The USA PATRIOT Act
1. Precursors
On September 14, 2001, President George W. Bush declared a state of
emergency in response to the terrorist attacks. 24 ' He made clear his intention to
mobilize the military to defend against any additional threat.4 2 Subsequently, on
September 24, 2001, the President expanded his response in an executive order
which gave the government the authority to freeze all assets of persons. 3 who
"have committed, or ... pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism
that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy,
or economy of the United States."2" Moreover, the President made it clear that
foreign financial institutions needed to improve cooperation with the United
States in disclosing financial information due to "the pervasiveness and
expansiveness of the financial foundation of foreign terrorists." 24 Finally, the
President authorized imposition of agricultural and medical sanctions against
246those who violate the order. Therefore, if an offshore jurisdiction failed to
disclose requested material of a party who is thought to be a threat, the United
States could restrict their food and medical supplies. This power is an effective
bargaining chip.247 Thus, soon after the terrorist attacks, the United States made it
clear that offshore financial centers needed to make more disclosures or face the
penalties. 24' This is consistent with the climate of hostility toward offshore
confidentiality. 249 Notwithstanding the new assault on offshore confidentiality,
and international pressure will ensure the demise of the offshore financial industry); ANTOINE, supra note 1,
11.12 (noting that it is the coercive pressure of sanctions and name and shame campaigns that are the greatest
threat to offshore centers).
240. Lacey, supra note 100, at 301; Rush D. Holt, Growing Concerns About Implementation of the
PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 4 No. 3 PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP. 7, 1 (2003); Bantekas, supra note 234, at 328-29
(discussing the domestic measures taken in the United States).
241. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001); See BANKING LAW, supra note 234,
§ 12.70 (discussing the impact of Proclamation No. 7463 and the President's response to the terrorist attacks).
242. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199; see BANKING LAW, supra note 237, § 12.4.A.1
(noting that in taking "dramatic steps" the President gave statutory authority to mobilize reserve troops and
recall active duty personnel).
243. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079-80 (Sept. 23, 2001) (stating that section 3(a)
defines person as "an individual or entity" and section 3(b) defines entity to include "partnership, association,
corporation or other organization, group or subgroup").
244. See 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (giving the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General the power to
determine who violates the executive order); see generally Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA
PATRIOTAct, Money Laundering, and the War on Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 959 (2003) (discussing
the purpose of Executive Order 13,224).
245. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079.
246. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,080-81.
247. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,080-81; BANKING LAW, supra note 234, § 12.71,
12.4A. I (discussing the ability of the President to sanction states for participation in crime).
248. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079; BANKING LAW, supra note 234, § I 2.4A. 1.
249. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 111.12; see also Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 417; James, supra note 2,
at 5-6; Sullivan, supra note 4, at 13.
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the signing of the USA PATRIOT Act gave the United States the tools it required
to compel disclosures and effect financial services regulations.
2. The Act
On October 26, 2001, only weeks after the September 11 th attacks, the USA
PATRIOT Act was signed into law with little debate or opposition. 25' The
purpose of the USA PATRIOT Act is to "Unite and Strengthen America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.
'252
The Act also gave the government new tools to track down terrorists by greatly
251
expanding federal power. Subsequently, critics expressed concern that the
hastily enacted legislation greatly increases the government's police powers,
allowing the government to tread on individual civil liberties, including financial
privacy.254 These sweeping new powers and the government's use of them have
255drawn much criticism.
3. Concerns
Initially, resistance to the USA PATRIOT Act was seen as unpatriotic.
256
However, with the passage of time, there has been growing domestic and
international concern regarding the USA PATRIOT Act's effect on civil
liberties.257  One article describes the Attorney General's response to the
September l1th attacks as "mounting a wholesale assault against civil
liberties. 258 Originally created in response to terrorist attacks against America,
250. See BANKING LAW, supra note 234, § 12.4A.3 (exploring the expanded regulations after the USA
PATRIOT Act); Lacey, supra note 100, at 305 (commenting on the expansion of banking regulations post USA
PATRIOT Act).
251. Holt, supra note 240, at 1; Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 966-68; Gouvin, supra note 244, at 960-61 (remarking that when Congress
adopted the Patriot Act there was minimal deliberation).
252. BANKING LAW, supra note 234, §12.4A.4.1; Holt, supra note 240, at 1.
253. BANKING LAW, supra note 234, §12.4A.4.1; Holt, supra note 240, at 1; See Evans, supra note 251,
at 968, 971-72 (describing changes to federal law allowing increased telephone surveillance, permitting the
Central Intelligence Agency to gather information about Americans and letting courts delay notice of a
warrant).
254. Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The
Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 4 (2002).
255. See Evans, supra note 251, at 934, 968 (noting that the Patriot Act chips away at Constitutional
protections); Marjorie Cohn, The Evisceration of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of September 11,
2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2003) (criticizing the actions of John Ashcroft and the Patriot Act).
256. Lacey, supra note 100, at 310-11.
257. See Cohn, supra note 255, at 1233; Holt, supra note 240, at 1; see also Barbara Dority, Your Every
Move, THE HUMANIST, Jan. 1, 2004, at 14 (discussing Jimmy Carter's condemnation of the U.S. leaders'
infringement on civil liberties).
258. Cohn, supra note 255, at 1233.
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the USA PATRIOT Act has been used to investigate many non-terrorist crimes.259
It can be inferred from the government's aggressiveness in violating the rights of
citizens and foreign nationals living inside the United States that the government
will not hesitate to force foreign banks to disclose more confidential
information.' 6° In fact, on September 24, 2001, after signing executive order
13,224 which authorized the financial attack upon terrorism, President Bush put
"banks and financial institutions around the world on notice., 26 Naturally, this is
a concern for the offshore banking industry as the USA PATRIOT Act retrofitted
U.S. money laundering policy and gave the government many new tools.2 62 In
passing the USA PATRIOT Act, the United States may have overreacted to the
horror of the September 11 th at the expense of important rights, such as financial
privacy.263
B. Banking Secrecy Post September 11th
The USA PATRIOT Act is the United States' most recent attack upon
Caribbean offshore banking. 2 4 Prior to September 11h, increased disclosure
requirements met a great deal of resistance because they were viewed as an
invasion of privacy and the procedures involved were considered unduly
265burdensome. In fact, two bills prior to the USA PATRIOT Act increaseddisclosure, but failed to pass because of objections from the financial community
259. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes from Drugs to Swindling, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28 2003, at I (noting that a guidebook for a Justice Department seminar on financial crimes stated that the
USA PATRIOT Act could be used for ordinary crime control); see generally Dority, supra note 257, at 9
(discussing infringement on civil liberties).
260. See Steve Tetreault, House Votes to Expand Powers, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Nov. 21,
2003, at 18A; Bantekas, supra note 234, at 329 (noting that within a three month period after September 11,
2001, the United States froze seventy-nine bank accounts); Cohn, supra note 255, at 1233 (claiming that
Attorney General Ashcroft mounted "a wholesale assault on civil liberties").
261. Press Release from the White House, President George W. Bush, Secretary of the Treasury O'Neil and
Secretary of State Powell, Remarks by the President, Secretary of the Treasury O'Neil and Secretary of State Powell on
Executive Order (Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010924-
4.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (discussing the intent to block terrorist
funding worldwide).
262. USA PATRIOT Act § 358; see John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring
Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice
Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1131 (2002) (noting that section 358 expands
disclosures of banking records for "financial analysis" a very low standard, yet a great investigative tool);
Rueda, supra note 236, at 145 (describing the USA PATRIOT Act as expanding U.S. ability to punish foreign
banks).
263. See Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 345, 373 (2003)
(observing that the extreme U.S. response to September 11 th showed signs of panic); Lacey, supra note 100, at
304 (noting that opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act was considered unpatriotic).
264. Geiger, supra note 4, at 34; see Lacey, supra note 100, at 304 (stating that the USA PATRIOT Act
expanded financial disclosure). Specifically, amendments to the RFPA and the "know your customer"
provisions increased disclosure requirements. Id.; Mottley, supra note 68, at 414 (noting that the USA
PATRIOT Act targets the offshore banking industry).
265. Lacey, supra note 100, at 304.
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and Congressional concerns for financial privacy.266 However, the emotional
turmoil that followed the September 1lth attacks provided the government with
the ideal climate to pass such legislation.267
Since its enactment in 2001, the United States has realized the potential of
the USA PATRIOT Act to access financial information.2 68 Title III of the USA
PATRIOT Act, also known as the International Money Laundering Abatement
and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 ("IMLAAFA"),269 most directly affects
offshore financial centers. 270 The IMLAAFA revamps U.S. money laundering
legislation and gives a few more cannons to American law enforcement to
compel financial disclosure. 71
The Act provides the Secretary of the Treasury with the power to require
domestic financial institutions to take "special measures" concerning jurisdictions
that are deemed a threat . 2 These special measures increase the necessary record-
keeping and report-filing procedures, including the duration and manner in which the
reports are kept, the identity and address of parties to transactions, the description of
any transaction, and the ownership of accounts.273 These measures apply to both
domestic and foreign banks that deal with the United States, and are a significant
expansion of previous requirements.274 Failure to comply with U.S. regulations will
266. See id. at 290-91 (referring to the Foreign Money Laundering Deterrence and the Anti-Corruption
Act, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong. (1999) and the Money Laundering Act of 2000, H.R. 4695, 106th Cong. (2000)
which both failed to pass due to vocal objections regarding privacy and financial confidentiality).
267. See id. at 304 (noting that previous vocal opposition to near identical money laundering provisions
contained in the USA PATRIOT act was muted); see also Evans, supra note 251, at 965-68 (noting that the
USA PATRIOT act was passed six weeks after the attacks, was debated for only two weeks, and faced little
resistance).
268. See Lichtblau, supra note 259, at 1 (commenting on a Justice Department seminar on financial crime that
proposed using the USA PATRIOT Act for ordinary crime control); Dority, supra note 257, at 4 (describing the
government use of increased information for ordinary crime control); Holt, supra note 240, at 1 (noting that there has
been criticism about how the government is accessing personal information); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Testimony of Juan C. Zarate, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Terrorism and Violent Crime, U.S. Dept of the
Treasury, to the House Financial Subcomm., Oversight and Investigations (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.
treas.gov/pres/releases/pol009.htm?IMAGE.X=17%5C&IMAGE.Y= 8 (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) (copy on file with
Transnational Lawyer) (testifying before Congress, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and Violent Crime,
U.S Department of the Treasury stated that "[d]aily we are in contact with foreign financial officials and are engaged in
bilateral and multilateral discussions regarding international cooperation and action against terrorist activities and
financing").
269. 31 U.S.C.A § 5318A; see USA PATRIOT Act § 311 (amending 31 U.S.C.A § 5318A).
270. See BANKING LAW, supra note 234, §§12.76-.77 (determining that IMLAAFA imposes regulations
on both domestic and foreign banks); Whitehead, supra note 262, at 1131 (observing that the IMLAAFA
increases monitoring financial transactions); Rueda supra note 236, at 151-52 (concluding that the IMLAAFA
allows the United States to punish foreign banks).
271. See supra note 270 and accompanying text; Fisher, supra note 113, at 450-51 (describing how the
IMLAAFA expands the ability of U.S. law enforcement agencies to coerce disclosure).
272. 31 U.S.C.A § 5318A (a)(1)); BANKING LAW, supra note 234, § 12.76; Rueda, supra note 236, at
151-52; Fisher supra note 113, at 450-51.
273. 31 U.S.C.A § 5318A (b)(1).
274. 31 U.S.C.A §§ 5318A (a-b); see Money Laundering Update 2002: What You Need to Know Now,
1337 PLI/CORP 361, 412 (Oct. 2002) (writing that the USA PATRIOT Act expands the reach of U.S. law
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likely result in the government implementing sanctions such as freezing assets,
agricultural and medical embargos, and prohibiting domestic banks from dealing
with that jurisdiction.275
A large number of investors and transactions in Caribbean offshore financial
276centers originate in the United States. The IMLAAFA could be devastating
because the United States now has the ability to eviscerate offshore confidentiality.277
Clearly, the USA PATRIOT Act goes beyond combating terrorism. It allows the
government to access financial information for ordinary crime control purposes.279
This is consistent with the limited protection that the United States has traditionally
given financial privacy.8
C. Legitimacy
Perhaps because of U.S. pressure, the international community has responded
in keeping with the United States' expanded definition of money laundering. s' In
fact, the United Nations and the FATF have adopted provisions similar to the
USA PATRIOT Act. 282 Now there is a great deal of concern that the USA
enforcement to restrict or prohibit access to designated foreign banks); see, e.g., BANKING LAW, supra note
234, §§ 12.76-.77; Rueda, supra note 236, at 189-90; Betty Santangelo, Tim O'Neal Lorah, and Megan
Elizabeth Murray, Analysis of Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of USA PATRIOT Act 4, (2001), at
http://www.sia.com/moneyLaundering/pdf/usPatiot.pdf (last visited on Feb. 16, 2004) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
275. 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 § 4; see Razzano, supra note 2, at 350 (demonstrating that the United States
has made effective use of its money laundering statutes; Rueda supra note 236, at 151-52 (concluding that
Congress took advantage of U.S. economic power to enforce sanctions in creating the IMLAAFA).
276. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 1 1.11 (stating that the majority of investors and transactions are from
the United States and the United Kingdom).
277. USA PATRIOT Act § 302(a)(4) (noting that offshore jurisdictions provide the anonymity needed
for terrorist financing); see Rueda, supra note 236, at 183 (determining that IMLAAFA targets offshore
financial centers); BANKING LAW, supra note 234, § 12.76-.77 (explaining the scope of Title III of the USA
PARTIOT Act).
278. See F. Mark Terison and H. Peter Del Bianco, Jr., Feature: Is Big Brother Watching Out For US?,
17 MAINE BAR J. 20, 26 (2002) (commenting that the USA PATRIOT Act goes beyond fighting terrorism); see
also Lichtblau, supra note 259 (noting that the justice department held a training seminar on how to use the
USA PATRIOT Act for ordinary crime control).
279. Terison, supra note 278, at 26; Lichtblau, supra note 259.
280. See INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 42, at 357 (concluding that the United States has limited
financial secrecy laws); see also Pasley, supra note 30, at 165-67 (stating that unlike general privacy rights
under the 4th Amendment, financial privacy rights have been narrowly interpreted and limit the protection
given to an individual's financial privacy); Blum, supra note 10, at 41 (stating that the United States is viewed
as the country that seeks disclosure of the most financial information from its banks).
281. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.72 (observing that the FATF was asked to expand its standards for money
laundering and terrorist financing); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Testimony of Juan C. Zarate,
Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Terrorism and Violent Crime, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm., (Mar. 18, 2003), at http://www.treas.gov/pres/releasesjs139.htm?1MAGE.X=17%5C&IMAGE.Y=8 (last
visited Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Zarate] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (describing U.S. efforts to
persuade the international community to expand terrorist offences); see also Rueda supra note 236, at 153-58.
(commenting on the European Union and the United Kingdom in their efforts to combat terrorism).
282. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. § 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1373 (2001); The Forty
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PATRIOT Act and other international regulations have expanded the definition
of money laundering.
Prior to the September 11th attacks, the definition of money laundering
encompassed transactions designed to hide or clean proceeds of illegal activities,
thus preventing people who have profited from criminal acts from enjoying the
rewards of their illegal behavior.284 After the attacks, the definition was expanded
to include those transactions which used legitimate funds transferred to an
alleged terrorist organization. 285 Thus, a person who transfers legitimate funds to
an organization that the United States determines is a terrorist organization may286
face criminal charges, in addition to having their legitimate funds frozen.
Freezing legitimate funds of an individual because of "extraneous illegal
activity" does not appear to be the proper use of a statute designed to prevent
laundering of illegal proceeds of criminal enterprise. Moreover, there are many
legitimate reasons for wanting to conceal one's identity when making legitimate
banking transactions.2 8  Regardless, the United States, using this expanded
definition, has used the IMLAAFA section of the USA PATRIOT Act to pursue
individuals who have used legitimate funds to support organizations that the
United States determines are terrorist organizations.288 Critics argue that this is
not permissible because an individual can be punished for legitimate transactions
with organizations that the government has deemed a terrorist organization
regardless of intent.29 In fact, a recent U.S. court decision struck down this
Recommendations, supra note 217, at 2; Mark Kantor, The War on Terrorism and the End of Banking Neutrality, 118
BANKING L.J. 891, 896-97 (2001); see OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MONEY LAUNDERING: A
BANKER'S GUIDE TO AVOIDING PROBLEMS 7 (2002), at http://www.occ.treas.gov/moneylaundering
2 00 2 .pdf (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer) (listing the various international agencies proactive response to terrorism).
283. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.74 (stating that using terrorism as a predicate offense to money
laundering is dangerous as it criminalizes use of legitimate funds); Kantor, supra note 282, at 896-97 (stating
that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 supports the USA PATRIOT Act's expanded power to confiscate
foreign assets); Gouvin, supra note 244, at 962 (observing that tracing terrorist financing is much different than
money laundering).
284. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.74 (concluding that money laundering legislation targets funds that
are the product of illegal activity rather than legitimate funds that are used to support illegal activities).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See id. (questioning the legitimacy of using a statute that focuses on the proceeds of criminal
enterprise to criminalize the use of legitimate funds).
288. See, e.g., id. 2.58; Ennis, supra note 5, at 642; Blum, supra note 10, at 41.
289. See Molly McDonald, Judge Opposes "Vagueness" In Anti-Terror Laws, ABA J. E-REPORT (Jan.
30, 2004), available at http:///www.abanet.org/joumal/ereport/j30partiot.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that the 9th Circuit declared unconstitutional a section of the
USA PATRIOT Act that made it illegal to fund an organization the government had determined was a terrorist
organization regardless of the individual's intent).
290. See Gouvin, supra note 244, at 959 (reinforcing the idea that expanded U.S. powers to freeze
foreign assets through "guilt by association" is at odds with international law). Additionally, the author states
that it is very difficult to define a terrorist organization because "one person's terrorist is often another person's
freedom fighter." Id. at 976-77; see ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.74; McDonald, supra note 289.
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portion of the USA PATRIOT Act as unconstitutional.29 Perhaps a better idea is
to create a new offense of terrorist financing rather than incorporating it into
current money laundering statutes.2 92 Regardless of concerns about the legitimacy
of terrorism as a predicate offense for money laundering, Caribbean jurisdictions
have responded quickly to assist the United States in tracking down terrorist
291financing.
29
V. CONCLUSION
Scrutiny of financial records has become commonplace as the global hunt for
terrorists continues. 294 The reality is that Caribbean offshore jurisdictions have
overwhelmingly complied with policies and regulations established by both the
United States and the international community regarding tax evasion, money
laundering, and terrorist financing because failure to do so will result in
economic disaster.9  Offshore jurisdictions realize that they cannot survive an
extended period with their financial systems under siege. 96 It is apparent that
failure to comply with requests for information regarding money laundering and
terrorist financing will result in the United States imposing economic sanctions.297
If a mere "advisory" or allegation of misconduct can cause serious financial
repercussions in offshore jurisdictions, then one can imagine the impact of being
labeled "on the terrorist watch list. '298 Broadly worded statutes, like the USA
PATRIOT Act, arm government agencies with an arsenal of regulations that aid
in compelling disclosure from offshore financial institutions.299 If the United
291. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 382, 385 (9' Cir. 2003); see McDonald, supra
note 289 (noting that the section of the Act was vague).
292. ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.74
293. Id.
294. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 6.69-72 (observing that post September 1lth the international
community began searching for terrorist monies and focused on offshore centers); see also Rueda, supra note
236, at 183 (stating that the USA PATRIOT Act is designed to attack the offshore banking industry).
295. See ANTOINE, supra note I, 6.76; (listing the Bahamas as one of several offshore jurisdictions
that has enacted sophisticated anti-money laundering statutes); New Year Greeting from the Managing Director,
THE SCHOONER (Cayman Is. Monetary Auth., Cayman Is.) (Dec. 2001) (stating that the Cayman Islands joins
forces with the world to fight terrorism and endorses the FATF recommendations against terrorism); see also
Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 417 (noting compliance to OECD regulations by offshore jurisdictions); Mottley,
supra note 68, at 413-14 (explaining that many Caribbean nations have complied with international demands).
296. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 11.35 (noting that offshore centers will have to retrofit and fall in line
with OECD regulations); see also Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 417 (commenting that blacklisting nations will
result in substantial detriment to their economies).
297. See Ennis, supra note 5, at 647 (discussing the current climate in which the United States would not
hesitate to sanction non-cooperative nations).
298. See Razzano, supra note 2, at 350-51 (citing several cases where banks failing to comply with
money laundering statutes were heavily penalized); see also Sultzer, supra note 181, at 203 (noting that both
Panama and the Bahamas lost many legitimate investors due to involvement in money laundering and
corruption).
299. See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 736-37 (stating that recent events, including tax and anti-money
laundering regulation have made it dangerous to rely on bank secrecy regulations to protect financial privacy
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States and the international community do not show restraint, current polices are
sure to deal Caribbean offshore confidentiality a fatal broadside, leaving those
nations changed forever. °°
when dealing with Caribbean offshore financial institutions); Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 417 (noting that
OECD regulations are an effective tool in coercing offshore jurisdictions into compliance); see also Sessel
supra note 124, at 565-66 (stating that offshore jurisdictions are under attack from multinational organizations);
Razzano supra note 2, at 327 (commenting on the U.S. onslaught on offshore banking confidentiality); Rueda,
supra note 236, at 145 (concluded that the USA PATRIOT Act gives the United States the ability to "punish"
foreign banks).
300. See ANTOINE, supra note 1, 2.39 (stating that the United States and the international community
have aggressively attacked confidentiality practices of offshore financial centers, thus reinforcing that
confidentiality by statute is no longer effective in shielding activities); see also id. 4.09 (stating that any attack
on offshore confidentiality will result in the financial ruin of offshore centers); Sullivan, supra note 4,
(describing offshore financial centers as going the "way of the dodo" as intense pressure from "global
watchdogs" and the United States will forever change offshore banking); ANTOINE, supra note 1, 12.23
(concluding that fundamental human rights and the rights of sovereign nations must be respected and the power
to limit these rights must be done proportionally); Hishikawa, supra note 9, at 417 (noting that the OECD and
international pressure have made the "death of tax havens inevitable").

